In May 2024 Tunisian commentator and lawyer Sonia Dahmani was arrested in Tunisia for violating the statutes of Decree-law No. 54. The decree, passed in 2022 by ‘strongman’ Tunisian President Kais Saied, is an anti-disinformation law that criminalizes the spread of ‘false’ or even ‘rumored’ information with the intent to disrupt public order, sow terror, or infringe on the rights of others. Dahmani was arrested after she made a critical remark against Saied on a radio station and was sentenced to two years in prison. A similar law exists in the Turkish landscape. The 2022 Law Amending the Press Law and Certain Laws numbered 7418 – dubbed the ‘Amendment Law’ – also employs broad, vague language and harsh punishments for the public spread of ‘false’ information.
The Center for Media Engagement at the University of Texas at Austin argues that both laws reflect a wider, already-in-motion trend: political elites and their allies strategically waning independent and healthy freedom of expression landscapes within democratic backsliding countries worldwide. We argue that these ‘anti-disinformation’ laws exist along a wider continuum of democratic backsliding (rather than manifesting from an anti-democratic vacuum). Democratic backsliding is defined and measured in varied ways and often depends on the discipline in which it is studied. For example, we may investigate case studies of democratic backsliding through socioeconomic performance (such as economic growth) or political systems (including electoral processes and political leaders). As media and journalism scholars, we select the analytical lens of freedom of speech and expression (including freedoms of the press) and how these rights are (or are not) translated onto digital realms. We align with democratic backsliding scholars who place responsibility of democratic recession unto political elites (rather than the populace) and highlight the strategic element of political leaders’ attacks on democratic institutions (such as the press, courts, and legislation) all under the ‘guise’ of democratic operations (such as elections). In fact, we argue that political elites creating and wielding ‘anti-disinformation’ laws to weaken freedom of speech is a tactic and tool borrowed from existent digital authoritarians. Here meaning, political leaders within authoritarian contexts that (attempt to) control all flows of information – what goes in, what goes out, and what goes on inside – in all online settings. We see political leaders within the Tunisian and Turkish contexts as ‘aspiring’ digital authoritarians operating under the guise of ‘democracy.’
It is not surprising that these strategic ‘anti-disinformation’ laws can impact an individual’s willingness to publicly express their political thoughts and participate in their country’s politics – otherwise known as chilling effects. We focus on Tunisia and Turkey to understand how these ‘anti-disinformation’ laws came to be and the potential impact they have on deliberative and open online spaces. We highlight these countries because of their regressing democratic institutions and processes, such as state interference in free and fair elections and the dwindling of a plurality of political voices in government and a centralization of power.
To understand how ‘anti-disinformation’ laws exist within continuums of democratic backsliding that produce chilling effects, we draw on insights from 28 in-depth, semi-structured interviews ( 11 from Tunisia and 17 from Turkey) with journalists, technologists, policy and media analysts, and communication consultants. We also conduct a close reading and textual analysis of the laws themselves.
What Can We Consider Chilling Effects?
A swath or broad regulation of online speech leads scholars to question its chilling effect. Within the U.S. context, the chilling effect describes when individuals engaging in an “activity protected by the First Amendment are deterred from doing so by government regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.” It is worth noting that deterrence is a ‘sliding scale’ that includes altered speech, reduced speech, or even the complete absence of speech as a result of government regulation. The reason for this deterrence is typically the fear of civil or criminal punishment, whether the speech law is explicitly clear and more easily understood or whether ambiguous language prompts greater confusion among individuals. Outside of the U.S. context, ‘chilling effects’ are seen in the European Union as, again, a sliding scale of deterrence – that can also include the prohibition of one fulfilling their “professional obligation” – as a result of ambiguously worded law that serves harsh punishment. International law guidelines surrounding chilling effects – and even harsh slander and defamation laws that impact chilling effects – do not always align with legal frameworks existent in Middle Eastern and North African countries.
Do ‘Anti-Disinformation’ Laws Impact Political Expression?
Tunisia and Turkey’s ‘anti-disinformation laws’ are a direct government regulation of speech that is otherwise protected under each country’s constitution – aligning with the framework of chilling effects. Here, speech – including the spread of ‘false’ information or ‘rumors’ – is restricted rather than protected. This speech is restricted through the use of ambiguous and sweeping language that is not further specified or defined, including defining what counts as ‘false information,’ ‘rumor,’ or the ‘intent’ of the messenger. The lack of definitions and parameters leaves individuals – especially those who depend on the circulation of public information for their livelihoods (i.e., journalists) – confused and fearful. This confusion and fear contribute to the strength of chilling effects: what is or is not allowed? Also, Tunisia’s Decree No. 54 and Turkey’s Amendment Law can be applied to a variety of information contexts since the language is so broad and unclear. For example, the prosecution of professional broadcast newsrooms or citizen-led political Facebook groups could fall under the jurisdiction of these laws’ sweeping proposals.
A key component of chilling effects is the harsh, disproportionate punishment laid out in speech law. In the Tunisian and Turkish context, this is seen through the harsh prison sentences prescribed for violation of the spread of ‘false’ information publicly. These laws also prescribe even harsher punishment under certain ‘false’ speech conditions. In Decree No. 54, this includes when the target of a ‘false’ information campaign is a public official. In the Amendment Law, this includes when the creator of ‘false’ information hides their identity during the information’s dissemination.
As our interviewees emphasize, the mere threat of imprisonment and even the process of being detained – not necessarily arrested – can act as a deterrent to publishing and circulating information. As seen in the result of chilling effects, interviewees describe how they engage in a sliding scale of self-censorship, including fully stopping, scaling back, or completely reconsidering the type and manner of information they choose to publish. Especially for media professionals and journalists, these introduced and repeated self-censorship practices establish a new, weakened journalistic norm within their country of work.
What are the Consequences?
The passing and implementation of these ‘anti-disinformation’ laws in Tunisia and Turkey dampens the existing speech and media landscape. However, the introduction of these laws in 2022 did not kick-start antidemocratic trends within these countries. Interviewees spoke of the passing of these laws as reinforcing an already increasingly undemocratic state where high consolidation of political power and weakening judiciary independence created a ripe environment for the implementation of strict cyber laws. Democratic backsliding acts as a continuum, which is why backsliding does not definitively claim that a country’s governance will always be a democracy or autocracy. A waning of pluralistic political or dissenting voices present in the legislature, judiciary, and, increasingly, press had already been witnessed by interviewees in Tunisia and Turkey.
Yet, the resulting chilling effects detailed here from the newly passed anti-disinformation laws further serve and strengthen political elite-led anti-democratic practices. Importantly, these chilling effects not only influence a weakening independence of journalism but also influence the political participation and expression of everyday citizens who popularly turn towards digital realms as their ‘public square,’ as many interviewees discussed. Through the passing of these laws, the public deliberation of political information is continually waning within both digital and traditional media spaces.
The passing and enforcement of these two laws also highlights the danger of governments crafting strict legislation that dissuades political participation ‘in the name of’ fighting false or deceitful information online. Fighting ‘false’ or ‘hateful’ information online can be achieved in multiple ways, including the self-regulation of platforms (i.e., through content moderation policies and platform guidelines) and government regulation of platforms. Here, the Tunisian and Turkish political elite approach this ‘fight’ through direct criminalization of speech across digital platforms. These anti-disinformation laws reflect a heavy government hand in monitoring and punishing social media expression.
The danger, though, is exemplified through Dahmani’s arrest. Trouble brews when political elites craft legislation to target dissenting or critical speech in order to bolster their political power and exert greater control of online and offline information environments. The Amendment Law takes this control a step further by managing tech companies’ physical presence within their country’s borders. For example, the law requires that tech companies have a Turkish resident and citizen act as their official representative. Furthermore, the Amendment Law enables easier government access to sensitive user data by outlining new rules for data collection, storage, and retrieval. These additions raise questions about the protection of users’ personal data against government interference.
Decree-law No. 54 and ‘Amendment Laws’ are not the only laws prosecuting freedom of speech and expression in democratic backsliding countries. Future research may look beyond these clear-cut and strict anti-disinformation laws and turn to alternative laws that also directly impact the integrity and freedom of a country’s information environment. For example, the twice-introduced and currently debated in parliament ‘Foreign Agent’ Law in Turkey (at the time of writing). This law –with a version already instituted in Georgia this year – targets civil society and other organizations that purportedly carry out acts against the state’s security or political interests. Here, media organizations receiving funding from foreign investors may constitute as acting against state interests. This is particularly troublesome for journalists and civil society organizations since domestic funding opportunities for on and offline ventures are limited due to government control and repression in the media landscape. In this case, outside funding for journalists and media professionals is a crucial element of organizational survival.
Repressive speech laws that claim to fight against ‘disinformation’ or protect ‘national security’ must be critically examined, especially within the lens of chilling effects and its sliding scale of self-censorship. As seen through Tunisia and Turkey’s elite-led endeavors, the consequences of these laws can result in the further deterioration of and control over weakened information environments in pursuit of strategic democratic backsliding.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge and thank former undergraduate research assistants Tanvi Prem, Meera Hatangadi, and Madison Esmailbeigi and former graduate fellow Salih Hurdogan for their assistance with interview outreach and analysis.
This study is a project of the Center for Media Engagement at The University of Texas at Austin and is supported by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, Omidyar Network, and Open Society Foundations.